Muhammad Is the Best Example

The moral argument is constantly misheard, so state it precisely. It does not claim that unbelievers cannot be good, cannot tell right from wrong, or cannot raise decent families. They plainly can and do. The argument is not about moral knowledge (how we come to recognize right and wrong) or moral practice (whether we live up to it). It is about moral ontology: what reality grounds genuinely binding moral obligations in the first place.

The Stanford Encyclopedia survey describes this whole family of arguments as reasoning from some feature of morality to God as its best explanation. The Christian is not insisting that atheists have no morals; he is pressing a question the atheist must also answer: when you say an act is truly wrong, not just unfashionable or forbidden by your tribe, what makes that true?

Two features of moral life resist easy reduction.

The first is binding obligation. Most people, on reflection, hold that torturing a child for entertainment is not just distasteful or socially counterproductive but really, mind-independently wrong, even if every society came to approve of it. That is a claim about how things are, not about how we happen to feel. A standard form of the argument grants exactly this: there are objective moral facts, and then asks what best explains them.

The second is human worth. We treat persons as having a dignity that does not rise and fall with their usefulness, their power, or the consensus around them. The weak, the unborn, the enemy, and the prisoner each retain a worth that forbids certain treatment. But if a human being is finally just rearranged matter, naturalism has no stable ground for that non-negotiable worth. Christianity grounds it in persons being made in the image of God: a dignity conferred by the Creator, not earned by achievement or assigned by society.

The unbeliever has real answers here, and they deserve real engagement rather than caricature.

• Morality is an evolved instinct. Very likely our moral feelings did emerge through evolution. But that explains the feeling, not the obligation. If “do not betray your friend” reduces to a useful impulse inherited from our ancestors, then in the cases where betrayal would actually pay, the impulse carries no authority to bind me. Explaining why we have moral sentiments is not the same as showing those sentiments answer to anything true.
• Morality is a social contract. Useful, but it makes the majority the measure. A society that agreed to exterminate a minority would, on this view, be doing nothing objectively wrong; only something others dislike. Almost no one truly believes that. The reformer who stands against his entire culture is often right against the consensus, which means the consensus was never the standard.
• Moral facts simply exist, with no God. This is the most serious option: a non-theistic moral realism on which values are real, abstract features of reality. It should be weighed honestly. But it fails to explain how an abstract value obligates a person or issues anything resembling a command. The atheist philosopher J. L. Mackie felt this so acutely that he judged objective moral facts would be metaphysically “queer,” too strange to fit a purely physical world, and so denied they exist at all. That is consistent, but notice the cost: moral outrage at real evil becomes, strictly, a useful illusion. Theism lets us keep the conviction that some things are really wrong.

The classic counter is the Euthyphro dilemma: is something good because God commands it (then goodness is arbitrary; he could have commanded cruelty) or does God command it because it is good (then goodness stands above God, and we never needed him)?

The Christian answer declines both horns. Goodness is neither an arbitrary divine decree nor a standard hovering above God; it is grounded in God’s own necessary and unchanging character. He does not consult an external rule of love and justice, nor invent one on a whim. He is love and justice, and his commands express what he is. Cruelty was never a live option, because it contradicts his nature.

Here the argument turns pastoral. The same moral law that lets us name evil for what it is also turns and indicts us, which is the honest weight underneath every appeal to the problem of evil. If there is a real moral law, we have all broken it. Christianity does not flinch from that verdict; it answers it with a cross. The God who grounds the law is the God who bore its penalty.

Start by clearing away a caricature. Testing a revelation claim is not the reflex of a closed mind; it is a biblical command. Paul tells the Thessalonians to “prove all things; hold fast that which is good.” John says “believe not every spirit, but try the spirits.” Luke praises the Bereans for examining even an apostle’s preaching against the Scriptures. Discernment is obedience, not suspicion.

The tests themselves are not improvised. The Scriptures give three:

• Prior revelation. A new claim is measured against what God has already made public. Isaiah’s rule is “to the law and to the testimony”: if a message does not accord with what God has said, the fault is in the message.
• Direction. Does the claim lead people toward the LORD, or away from him toward another god or another gospel?
• Fulfillment. Does what the prophet predicts actually come to pass?

Notice that all three are public. None of them asks how sincerely the claimant believes, how moving the experience felt, or how rapidly the movement grew. They ask whether the claim is true and where it leads.

The most important test is also the most counterintuitive. In Deuteronomy 13, Moses imagines a prophet whose sign or wonder actually comes true, and then says, “let us go after other gods.” The verdict is unflinching: do not heed him, “for the LORD your God putteth you to proof.” A genuine wonder does not license a message that turns you from the true God; if anything, it becomes the test.

This settles a move that recurs in almost every later claim: but there were miracles, healings, a transformed life, a beautiful book. Grant the experience for the sake of argument. The framework still asks the prior question: toward which God, and which gospel, does the claim lead? Paul makes the same point at full strength: “though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you… let him be accursed.” He even warns that “Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light.” An angelic visitation, a recovered record, or a heavenly messenger does not exempt a message from the test; it raises the stakes of applying it. This is why a claimed restoration after a total apostasy cannot rest on the impressiveness of its origin story alone.

Deuteronomy 18 gives the bluntest test of all. If a prophet “speaketh in the name of the LORD” and “the thing follow not, nor come to pass,” then “the LORD hath not spoken” it, and the people need not fear him. A datable, falsifiable prediction that fails is not a minor blemish on an otherwise reliable prophet; in the Torah’s own terms it marks the prophet as one who “hath spoken it presumptuously.”

Applied consistently, this test is decisive against movements that staked their authority on specific, failed predictions, especially the claim that Christ’s kingdom began invisibly in 1914, which descends from a chain of revised dates. The point is not to mock; it is to take the prophet’s own claim seriously enough to check it, exactly as Moses required.

The serious objection is that the whole framework begs the question: Christians simply assume their revelation is the standard and then judge every rival by it. Doesn’t every faith do that, and don’t the tests just hand victory to whoever owns the measuring stick?

Three replies keep the framework honest:

• The standard is usually shared. The later claims this framework most often meets do not reject the prior Scriptures; they appeal to them. Movements that claim the Bible was corrupted or that a prophet was foretold in it are arguing on the Bible’s turf. Testing them by that prior revelation is fair on their own terms, not an imposition.
• The tests are public, not tribal. Agreement with prior revelation, direction toward the true God, and fulfilled prediction are checkable by anyone. They are not “because we say so”; they are the criteria Moses, Isaiah, and Paul put on the table for friend and critic alike.
• Christians must submit to the same tests. This is the decisive point. The framework is not a weapon aimed outward only. The faith stakes itself on a public, falsifiable event: the resurrection as God’s vindication of Jesus, in continuity with the prophets who went before. A Christian who will not let his own claim be tested has abandoned the very rule he is invoking.

So the door is not arbitrarily shut to new revelation. It is the door God himself installed and, in the Son, decisively closed, which is the argument that the apostolic gospel is final.

The decisive issue is not whether the word Trinity appears in a verse, or whether Jesus ever recites the sentence “I am God.” The question is whether the New Testament places Jesus within the unique identity of the one God of Israel; the God who alone created all things, who alone bears the divine name, and who alone is worshiped.

Richard Bauckham calls this a Christology of divine identity: the earliest Christians did not first define an abstract divine nature and then ask whether Jesus possessed it. They identified Jesus by what only God does and who only God is; creating and sustaining all things, ruling from the heavenly throne, bearing the name above every name, and they did this while remaining Jewish monotheists. Reading the texts this way keeps us from a fruitless hunt for a single proof verse and lets the whole pattern speak.

That also puts the familiar Liar, Lunatic, or Lord argument in its proper place. It is not a substitute for exegesis or history. It asks whether “great teacher but not Lord” still makes sense once the New Testament portrait of Jesus is actually in view.

John opens by saying the Word was with God and was God, then says all things were made through him, and finally that the Word became flesh as Jesus. The two clauses are deliberate. “With God” keeps the Word personally distinct from the Father; “was God” refuses to make him anything less than fully divine. Christian doctrine simply preserves both halves: the Son is not the Father, and the Son is not a creature.

Some translations render the last clause “the Word was a god,” a move examined in John 1:1 does not say “a god”. But the wider sentence settles the sense: the one through whom all things were made cannot himself be one of the made things. John 8:58 points the same direction, where Jesus says that before Abraham was born, “I am”; language that echoes the LORD’s own self-identification (“I am he”) in Isaiah, and which his hearers treat as a divine claim worth stoning him for.

The sharpest line in Jewish monotheism runs between the Creator and everything created. The New Testament repeatedly puts Jesus on the Creator side of it:

• Colossians 1:15-17 says all things in heaven and earth were created through him and for him, that he is before all things, and that in him all things hold together. The title “firstborn over all creation” names rank and heirship, not a date of manufacture; the next verses exclude his being a creature by making him the one through whom creation itself came to be.
• Hebrews 1 has the Father address the Son directly as “God” whose throne endures forever, and command the angels to worship him.
• In 1 Corinthians 8:6 Paul takes Israel’s confession that the LORD is one and unfolds it around “one God, the Father” and “one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom all things came.” He does not add a second god; he places Jesus inside the very confession of the one God.

This is why “firstborn” and “image of the invisible God” cannot be read as “first creature.” The same passage that uses those words makes Jesus the source, not a product, of creation.

Do not let the conversation be narrowed to one modern sentence, as though Jesus had to say the exact words “I am God; worship me” before the evidence counts. The Synoptic Gospels often show his identity by what he does, how he speaks, and where he places himself in Israel’s story.

Mark gives several examples. Jesus calls twelve disciples, standing over the restored people of God rather than simply taking one tribal seat among them. In the vineyard parable, he distinguishes himself from the servants sent before him and identifies himself as the beloved son sent by the owner after the prophets. He knows what opponents are reasoning in their hearts, a knowledge Scripture reserves to God, and he stills the sea in a way that echoes Psalm 107, where the LORD quiets the storm and delivers those who cry to him.

None of these replaces the direct texts in John, Paul, Hebrews, and Revelation. They show that the divine-identity pattern is not limited to one Gospel or one proof verse.

Larry Hurtado documents that the worship of Jesus; prayer to him, hymns about him, calling on his name, baptizing into him; is present astonishingly early, among Jewish believers who would not bow to any creature, and not as a slow later development. That devotional pattern is itself evidence of how the first Christians understood him.

Scripture shows the same instinct. John says Thomas answered Jesus directly, “My Lord and my God.” This is not a stray exclamation into the air. When apostles or angels are wrongly treated as divine, they refuse the honor and redirect it to God; Herod is judged for receiving divine praise. Jesus does not correct Thomas. He receives the confession and commends the faith that sees him truly.

Revelation makes the same point in another register. Jesus calls himself “the First and the Last,” a title the LORD claims for himself in Isaiah, and the Lamb receives creation-wide worship with the One on the throne.

Several texts sharpen the same point from another angle. In Revelation 5, every creature in heaven, on earth, under the earth, and in the sea gives blessing, honor, glory, and might to the One on the throne and to the Lamb. The Lamb is not listed as one more creature joining the song. He receives the worship of the whole creation with God.

Jesus also asks the Father to glorify him with the glory he had with the Father before the world existed, while Isaiah says the LORD does not give his glory to another. John then says Isaiah saw Jesus’ glory when he quotes Isaiah’s temple vision. The apostolic writers are not embarrassed to speak this way because they are not giving divine honor to a creature. They are confessing the Son who shares the Father’s glory while remaining personally distinct from the Father.

Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1 compress the same confession into doxological language about Jesus Christ as God and Savior. The natural reading is strengthened by comparison with 2 Peter 1:11, where “Lord and Savior” plainly names one person, Jesus Christ. Grammar should not be oversold as a magic formula that ends every dispute, but in context the titles fit the wider pattern: Jesus receives the names, works, glory, worship, and saving role of the one God.

By this point, the argument should be read cumulatively. The New Testament does not merely say isolated exalted things about Jesus. It joins his claims, actions, worship, apostolic confession, and Old Testament titles into one pattern: Jesus is personally distinct from the Father, yet he receives what belongs to God alone.

The later creeds did not invent worship of Jesus. They gave careful vocabulary to a devotion already present in the church’s earliest life. Ignatius of Antioch, writing near the beginning of the second century, speaks of Jesus Christ as God while also distinguishing him from the Father. Pliny the Younger, a Roman governor hostile to Christian worship, reported around the same period that Christians gathered to sing to Christ as to a god.

That evidence does not replace the biblical case. It answers the historical claim that Jesus’ deity was a late fourth-century corruption. Before Nicaea, Christians were already worshiping Christ, and outsiders already recognized that worship as directed to him.

The strongest objection gathers the texts where Jesus looks subordinate: he says “the Father is greater than I,” he does not know the day or hour, he prays, he is “sent,” and he will be “subjected” to the Father. If he is God, how can any of this be true?

Two distinctions carry the weight:

• Distinction of persons. The Son is not the Father. A Son who is sent by, prays to, and lovingly defers to the Father is exactly what Trinitarian confession expects. These texts tell against modalism (the idea that Father and Son are one person under two names), not against the Son being God.
• The incarnation. Philippians 2 says the one who existed “in the form of God” and did not cling to equality with God “emptied himself” and took “the form of a servant.” The Son did not stop being God; he took up a genuine human life, within which he could grow, pray, and submit. “The Father is greater” then describes the Son’s position in his earthly mission, not a lesser nature.

Read this way, the subordination texts are not embarrassments to be explained away. They are precisely what you would expect if the eternal Son truly became one of us, and the same Gospels that record his prayers also record Thomas worshiping him and John calling him God. Related objections are handled at Jesus never claimed to be God and Jesus is Michael the archangel.